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THE TRIPLE ENTENTE AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 
By David M. Hannah 
A review of the history and circumstances surrounding 
the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance provides a 
revealing insight into a key disease of western civilization 
in our time. 
11 The greatest single underlying cause of the 
war was the system of secret alliances which 
developed after the Franco-Prussian War. It 
gradually divided Europe into two hostile groups 
of Powers who were increasingly suspicious of one 
another and who steadily built up greater and 
greater armies and navies. Though this system of 
alliances in one sense tended to preserve peace, 
inasmuch as the members within one group often 
held their friends or allies in restraint for fear 
of becoming involved in war themselves, the system 
also made it inevitable that if war did come it 
would involve all the Great Powers of Europe. The 
members of each group felt bound to support each 
other, even in matters where they had no direct 
interest, because failure to give support wo~d 
have weakened the solidarity of the group. 11 
The Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance may be looked 
at in several contexts. Viewed historically, the Triple 
Entente and the Triple Alliance were not isolated events 
but part of a whole complex series of international 
maneuvers, combinations and recombinations during the 
period from the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 to the outbreak 
of World War I. The period following the Franco-Prussian 
War was characterized by increasing diplomatic activity 
following the long period of post-Napoleonic peace. This 
diplomatic activity stemmed partly from a consuming French 
1 Sidney Fay Origins of the World War (New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1931) P:-3z;;-- -
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desire to find security against Germany, partly from the 
pressure of Germany, newly unified and desperately seeking 
to catch up with the rest of the world and striving to 
develop a colonial empire. Germany, fearing French 
revenge for the hUmiliating def eat and the cession of 
Alsace-Lorraine, undertook to isolate France by forming 
the Triple Alliance. Italy was seeking to expand around 
the Mediterranean. Austria-Hungary hoped to extend its 
influence by profiting from the instability of the Balkans 
and the declining power of the Ottoman Empire. 
In this situation Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy 
formed the Triple Alliance of 1882. In response to this 
initiative, France sought an alliance with Russia, 
bracketing Germany and raising the specter of a two front 
war which had long haunted the Germans. In 1893 France 
and Russia signed a formal defensive treaty known as the 
Dual Alliance. 
Britain, standing somewhat aloof, but none the less 
interested in this competition for domination of the 
continent, tried in various ways to cement its position 
with all sides. In 1890 the Anglo-German Treaty settled 
British-German differences in Africa and ceded the 
Island of Helgoland to Germany. However this effort ~t 
peace-making was short-lived and could not survive 
German ambitions. In 1902 the British made an alliance 
with Japan, taking account of the fact that both island 
empires wanted to off set against expanding continental 
powers, particularly Russia. In 1904 Britain and France 
signed a bilateral entente by which they disposed of 
numerous differences between themselves around the world, 
including Egypt, Morocco, Newfoundland, Siam, Nigeria 
and islands in the Pacific. This was the genesis of 
the Triple Entente. The Anglo-French entente super-
imposed upon the Franco-R11Ssian Alliance was a step 
toward the Triple J:ntente. The next step was ta.ken in 
1907 when Britain and Russia negotiated a similar bilateral 
entente resolving their differences in Asia, including 
Persia, .Afghanistan and China. This Anglo-Russian Treaty 
was designed to protect the rear of both countries in 
order to allow them to concentrate on the rising threat 
in Europe by Germany. Now the Triple Entente and the 
Triple Alliance were complete. The fact that they survived 
into World War I resulted not so much from their own 
internal cohesion as from the rising external threat which 
continued to drive the countries together in their 
respective alliances. Germany pressed hard in Africa, 
precititating two serious crises in Morocco in 1905 and 
1911. Italy attacked Turkey in a grab for Libya in 1911. 
The Balkan states, taking advantage of the senility of 
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the Ottoman ]Cmpire revolted in 1912 and Austria-H'Ungary 
sought to profit at the expense of Serbia. 
Did the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance 
succeed? Yes and No. They succeeded to the extent that 
they formalized the pattern of the alliances in World War 
I, but they failed in that they did not prevent war. What 
can be learned from the experience of the Triple Entente 
and the Triple Alliance with respect to the balance of 
power theory? In the first place they did not preserve 
the balance. Even more important, however, is the fact 
that they illustrate the impossibility of a balance of 
power in the absence of fundamental agreement among the 
participants regarding the nature of the world they are 
trying to preserve. Treaties and alliances in themselves 
do not create order or stability; they only reflect such 
stability as may already exist. 
The threat to Europe had its beginnings in the 
unif ieation of Germany by Bismarck. In 1862 Bismarck 
became the Chancellor of Prussia under William I. William 
I had been a soldier in his youth and had campaigned 
against Napoleon. One of his first moves had been to 
reorganize the army, for Prussian prestige in the past 
had sunk to an all time low among the Great Powers. 
When the I1ng of Denmark and the German States were in 
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disagreement over the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein 
the opportunity for which Bismarck had been waiting had 
arrived. Persuading Austria to act with him, he 
overwhelmed Denmark, forcing her to surrender the two 
disputed Duchies to Austria and Prussia. 
So long as Austria continued to be a member of the 
German Confederation, Prussia could not go ahead with her 
plans for unification. So when trouble developed as to 
the disposition of Schleswig and Holstein, Bismarck did 
nothing to prevent the quarrel. He was in fact preparing 
for war with Austria. Napoleon III gave Bismarck a 
guarantee of neutrality, receiving in exchange vague 
promises of Rhineland territory. 
In seven short weeks Bismarck's army had accomplished 
his purpose. Austria's main army was crushed at Sadowa 
in 1866, and she was forced to withdraw from the German 
Confederation. In fact Bismarck had destroyed the whole 
German Confederation. Now he was ready to proceed. He 
organized a union of North German States under Prussian 
domination. Hanover and five other states were also 
annexed to Prussia against their will. This was the first 
step in Biamarck1 s plan for national unity. He now 
turned his attention to the southern states of Germany. 
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By a series of diplomatic moves Bismarck precipitated 
the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 in which south 
Germany took part, thus making it a national struggle 
instead of merely Prussian., The entire country had 
become a unit, and the French were overwhelmed at 
Sedan in September of 1870. By the terms of the Treaty 
of Frankfort: 
1. The Germans, in order to prevent the rise of 
France, took the provinces of Alsace and 
Lorraine. 
2. France was forced to pay a huge indemnity 
of 5,000,000 francs. The Germans were to 
occupy Northern France until the debt was 
paid. 
Through this victory Bismarck had cemented the union 
of the German states. "Bismarck's unification of Germany 
was hailed at the time as a desirable, even glorious, 
2 
accomplishment of the spirit of nationalism. 11 Thus 
was born in Europe a new political state. 
Bismarck had made a serious mistake in the taking ot 
Alsace-Lorraine from the French, because it was a 
2 Sidney Fay Origins of the World War (New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1931) P:-51 -
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humiliating defeat that France never forgot. "The new 
structure of the German Empire was burdened at the 
outset by a French mortgage, as it were, since in the 
future every foe of Germany could reckon unconditionally 
upon French support.• 3 The price paid ror Alsaoe-
Lorraine was the undying determination of France for 
revenge. Bismarck was acutely aware or this and watched 
anxiously as France made moves which might break down 
Germany•s new position. Bismarck said that the land he 
had taken from France had been wrested from Germany by 
Louis XIV when Germany was weak and divided. 
To keep France from forming any alliance that 
might be detrimental to Germany, Bismarck was determined 
to isolate France from any potential ally. ·He adopted 
a policy of malting new alliances, thereby hoping to keep 
France from making any alignment which might be harmful 
to Germany. "He must therefore protect the new German 
Empire, the child of his creation, by malting it strong 
4 
of itself--strong by holding France weak and isolated." 
3 Charles Seymour The Diplomatic Background of the 
War (New Haven: Yale University Press 1933) P. 1~ -
4 Sidney B. Fay The Origins of the World War (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1931) p;-53 -
One of his first objectives was an alliance with 
Russia, for Germany, lying between Russia and France, 
might be made the object of a two front war. Russia 
and Prussia had been friendly since the days of 
Napoleon, and the Crimean War had strengthened this 
feeling of friendship. Russia had remained neutral 
during the Franco-Prussian War and Germany had allowed 
Russia to send her warships out on the Black Sea. 
There had been a bond between the two countries because 
of the friendship of Kaiser Wilhelm and Alexander II 
of Russia. 
Bismarck also desired friendship with Austria 
believing that the similarity of the German racial 
element in both countries should cause them to be 
natural friends. He had refrained from taking any land 
or entering Vienna with troops after the Treaty of 
Sadowa. Bismarck's greatest difficulty in securing a 
union of Austria and Germany lay with Beust, the 
Austrian chancellor, who hated Prussia and Bismarck, 
and who refused to be drawn into a treaty with Bismarck, 
but gravitated toward France. Bismarck was determined 
to get rid of Beust. The Hapsburg Empire was divided 
into three divisions, the Germans, Maygars and Slavs. 
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The compromise of 1867 had divided the power between 
the Germans and the Maygars who were jealous of each 
other. Since Beust refused Bismarck's advances, 
Bismarck turned to the Maygars who were led_by Count 
Andrassy. Count Andrassy thought he saw an opportunity 
to make the Maygars supreme so Beust was overthrown as 
Chancellor of Austria and replaced by Andrassy. Now the 
Maygars were tree to extend their influence into the 
Balkans and Bismarck was tree to establish closer ties 
with Austria. 
In the summer of 1871 Emperor William of Germany and 
Francis Joseph of Austria met on Austrian soil for a 
friendly visit and in April of 1872 the two met in Berlin. 
Alexander of Russia did not want to be left out so he 
suggested that he come to Berlin. The three monarchs 
established close relations though there were no written 
agreements. In a sense this entente was a renewal of the 
Holy Alliance. The three were to stand together against 
the rising tide of socialism and for the general peace of 
Europe. In 1873 the League of the Three Emperors was 
strengthened by a meeting at St. Petersburg. Russia and 
Germany promised each other the assistance of 200,000 
men in case of attack by a European power. A few weeks 
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later Czar Alexander went to Austria, and he and Francis 
Joseph signed an agreement to consult one another about 
differing opinions. In the following year the King of 
Italy also crone to Berlin and announced his adherence to 
the Three Emperor's League. So it appeared that France 
had been isolated since Great Britain was not active in 
European affairs at this time. 
The League did not prove to be of any permanent value, 
and the understanding that existed between the three 
emperors was soon destroyed by the strain of two crises. 
The first of these occurred in 1875 when it seemed as if 
war might again break out between France and Germany. 
Gorchakov, the foreign minister of Russia, was jealous 
of Bismarck and leaned toward an alliance with France. This 
caused Bismarck to fear he might use his influence against 
him with Czar Alexander of Russia. so Bismarck sent 
Radowitz to Russia to take the place of the ailing German 
ambassador. Gorchakov had circulated rumors that Radowitz 
had been sent to secure from Russia her consent to Germany 
having a free hand in France if Russia could have a free 
hand in the Orient. This alarmed France, and her foreign 
minister appealed to the Czar and to England to prevent 
German aggression against France. After the tension had 
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eased, Gorchakov•s vanity was appeased by his announcement, 
"Now peace has been established." Thus the first war scare 
was over, but now cooler relationships existed between 
Russia and Germany. 
A new threat to the League of Three Emperors was brought 
about by the Near Eastern Crises of 1875-1878. The "sickman 
of Europe", Turkey, was committing outrages and causing 
suffering among her Christian subjects, and Russia again 
wondered about his demise. The Christians revolted in 
Herzegovina and the revolt spread into Bosnia. Turkey 
seemed powerless to stop it which put Russia and Austria 
in their old difficulty over the Balkans. Austria did not 
wish to see these Christians achieve their independence and 
become subservient to Russia. For fifteen years Bismarck 
worked to prevent this rivalry in the Balkans because he 
did not wish to see either of the two powers gravitate 
toward France and wished them to remain friends. He said, 
11 if, to our sorrow this was not possible 
between Russia and Austria then we could endure 
indeed that our friends should lose or win 
battles against each other, but not that one of 
the two should be so severely wounded and injured 
that its position as an independent Great Power, 
taking its part in the councils of Europe, would 
be endangered." 5 
5 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Allianc.!'., and Triple 
Entente (New York: Henry Holt and Co. 1947) P. 10 
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Schmitt in his book "takes the stand that it is 
significant that Bismarck had chosen Austria and that 
6 decision governed his policy for the rest of his career." 
Russia recognized Bismarck's decision and abandoned 
war against Austria to fight against the Turks, forcing 
her to accept the Treaty of San Stefano of 1877 which 
created a great Bulgarian state. This neither Austria 
nor England liked, for they feared Bulgaria would become 
a Russian vassal. So they asked for a revision of the 
treaty. Bismarck, the so called "Honest Broker", consented 
to act as mediator and invited the Great Powers to the 
Congress of Berlin. His aim was to satisfy the claims and 
interests of both Austria and Russia. Austria was again 
given the right to occupy and administer Herzegovina and 
Russia acquired part of Bessarabia lost in 1856 and other 
territory between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. 
Gorchakov felt that Bismarck had betrayed Russia in view 
of the fact that Russia had been a "benevolent neutralu 
during the Franco-Prussian War. The result of this 
personal bitterness between the two ministers and of the 
violent newspaper attacks of one country against the other 
put an end, for the time being, to that harmony and 
cooperation which had been the object of the Three 
Emperors' League. 
6 Ibid, P. 10 
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Russia increased her armaments and placed troops 
near the German borders. Czar Alexander wrote a letter 
to Emperor William complaining of Bismarck's policies 
and warning that disaster might follow such policies. 
General Mileutin declared, 11 Russ1a must be prepared for 
war • ., 7 
At the same time Bismarck heard that his friend 
Andrassy was soon to resign and was likely to be replaced 
by Baron Haymerle :1 a friendship on which he was not sure 
that he could count. In view of this new danger he 
decided on an alliance with Austria, while Andrassy was 
still in office. He drew up a treaty of October 7, 1879, 
which established the Austro-German Alliance. The 
alliance provided: 
1. That if Germany or Austria were attacked by 
Russia the one contracting party would come to 
the aid of the other. 
2. If either of the contracting parties were attacked 
by France or Italy the other contracting party 
would maintain a benevolent neutrality. 
3. This treaty was made renewable every five years. 
4. It was to remain secret. 
7 Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the World War (New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1931) P. 08- -
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This alliance was defensive in char~cter, and it 
consolidated the central empires and proved to be the 
foundation of the German policy until her collapse in 
November, 1918. The alliance was known as the Dual 
Alliance and was regarded by contemporaries as 
Bismarck's master stroke. But after 1914 when German 
support of Austria involved Europe in World War I, it 
was thought that the alliance had pushed Russia and 
France into an alliance, and Germany, by siding against 
Russia, had paved the way for the clash of 1914. 
Giera, who replaced Gorcha.kov, still wanted closer 
relations with Germany. Thus Bismarck, through diplomatic 
concessions, permitted the League of the Three Emperors 
to be revived in 1881. It lasted until 1887. It ran out 
because of Alexander•s distrust of Austria over the Balkans. 
Bismarck's relations with France grew steadily worse 
and his worst fear was a Franco-Russian proposal of 
alliance. He therefore agreed to a Russian proposal that 
in place of the triparite agreement Germany and Russia 
would have an agreement without Austria. This treaty is 
known as the "Reinsurance Treaty" of 1887. The terms 
were as follows. 
l. If one of the High Contracting Parties shall 
find itself at war with a third Great Power 
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the other will maintain a benevolent neutrality 
and will devote its energy to localize the 
conflict. This provision made Germany sa.f'e on 
the eastern frontier. The southern frontier was 
protected by Austria's promise of a benevolent 
neutrality. Furthermore this treaty did not 
conflict with the treaty with Austria-Hungary. 
2. The treaty also recognizes the rights historically 
acquired by Russia in the Balkans. 
3. Article III said that Russia and Germany should 
support each other in putting pressure on the 
Sultan to keep the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles 
closed to the warships of other powers. They 
also pledged themselves to permit no modification 
of the status quo in the Balkans. 
The formation of the Triple Alliance is commonly 
ascribed to the "iron man", Bismarck. He had encouraged 
the French plans in Tunis in order to make friends with 
France so that they might forget their def eat in 1870. 
Bismarck was hoping the French would maintain their 
interest in North Africa and China forgetting their 
determination to recover Alsace-Lorraine. He did not 
object to the French antagonizing the Italians who also 
had an interest in North Africa, but he was not planning 
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to make an alliance with Italy. However, early in 1882, 
Italy in order to strengthen her own position and to 
gain support for further plans, asked for an alliance 
with Germany and Austria. By this she felt she had 
everything to gain and nothing to lose. She had been 
disappointed at the Congress of Berlin in that she had 
been given nothing and was further resentful when the 
French occupied Tunis, the territory she had hoped to 
gain for herself. While Bismarck was not eager for this 
alliance he realized that it would strike a blow at the 
French desire for revenge, so he suggested that the 
Italians consult the Austrians. This resulted in the 
negotiating and signing of the Triple Alliance in Vienna 
on May 20, 1882. 
"The general purposes of Austria, Italy, and 
Germany were, according to the preamble, 1to augment 
the guarantees of peace in general, to strengthen 
the monarchical principle, and by this to insure 
intact the maintenance of the social and political 
order in their respective states by agreeing to 
conclude a treaty which by its essentially conservative 
and defensive character aimed only to protect them 
against the dangers which might menace the safety of 
their states and the peace of Europe. 1 " 
'Art. I. 1The High Contracting Powers mutually 
promise peace and friendship, and will enter into 
no alliance or engagement directed against any one 
of their States. * * * 111 
"Art.- II. 1 In case Italy, without direct 
provocation on her part, should be attacked by 
France, for any reason whatsoever, the two other 
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contracting parties shall be bound to lend help 
and assistance with all their forces. This same 
obligation shall devolve upon Italy in case of 
any aggression without direct provocation by 
France against Germany.'" 
"Art. III provided for the danger of a Franco-
Russian coalition: 1 If one, or two, of the High 
Contracting Parties, without direct provocation on 
their part, should chance to be attacked and to be 
engaged in a war with two or more Great Powers 
non-signatory to the present treaty, the casus 
foederis will arise simultaneously for all the 
High Contracting Parties. 1 This virtually extended 
to. Italy the principle agreed upon between Austria 
and Germany in 1879, except that the addition of 
the words •without direct provocation• gave the 
obligation a more restricted and purely defensive 
character. 11 
11Art. IV: 1 In case a Great Power, non-signatory 
to the present treaty, should threaten the security 
of the states of one of the High Contracting Parties, 
and the threatened Party should find itself forced 
on that account to make war against it, the two 
others bind themselves to observe towards their 
Ally a benevolent neutrality. Each of them reserves 
to itself, in this case, the right to take part in 
the war if it should see fit to make common cause 
with its Ally. 111 
"Art. V was calculated to secure solidarity 
of action. 11 
"The Treaty of Alliance was for five years, and 8 its contents and its existence were to be kept secret." 
8 Sidney B. Fay, The Origins of the World War (New York: The MacMillan Co., 19JIT p:-a2-84 -
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Italy 1 s prestige and power were increased by alliance 
with the German Empire and she was now regarded as one ot 
the Great Powers. Another important advantage to her was 
that Austria was no longer Italy's enemy but had become her 
ally. 
Austria's chief advantage from the treaty was a 
guarantee that if Russia attacked her over issues in the 
Balkans her frontier with Italy would be secure trom attack 
so that her armies would not have to be divided. 
Germany hoped that Italy would not now be able to 
ally herself with France, and would discourage the revenge 
party in France. If Russia joined France it would be a 
great advantage to Germany to be relieved of the fear in 
regard to Italy. 
On October 30, 1883, the Austro-Rumanian Treaty was 
signed as another bulwark against war. 
On March of 1890 came the dismissa1 of Bismarck and 
now the way was paved for the formation of a Franco-Russian 
Alliance. The new chancellor Capriv1 had not renewed the 
treaty with Russia and Russia, like France, found herself 
isolated. Then, too, Germany•s rapid growth of industry, 
commerce, naval ambitions and colonial expansion further 
posed a threat to Russia. Another factor was Russia's 
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determination to dominate the Balkans. This antagonized 
Austria so William II had to choose between Russia and 
Austria and he chose Austria, thus making Russia an enemy 
of the Central Powers. A third factor was the idea of 
France's determination to seek revenge on Germany. But 
France had become more stable as a government and the 
Czar saw her in a different light. 
The Franco-Russian Entente of 1891, which became the 
alliance of 1894, was brought about by the distrust of 
Germany felt by both countries. They were also aware that 
Great Britain was friendly to the members of the Triple 
Alliance and consequently they felt isolated. This feeling 
of isolation gradually drew them together in spite of the 
differences in their forms of government. Russian 
suspicion of Germany stemmed partially from the fact that 
Bismarck had sent German officers to drill the Turkish 
army. This move the Russians could not reconcile with 
Bismarck's assurances that he was not interested in 
Constantinople or the Balkans • 
.Another situation which had developed added to Russian 
distrust of Germany. The Russian ruble had fallen and 
German newspapers attacked Russian credit. The Russians 
had suspected that Bismarck had inspired this attack and 
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so were more willing to turn to France for the loan they 
needed. This the French were willing to grant. First, 
because it gave them a good investment for their savings. 
Second, by becoming Russiats creditor they were furthering 
their interest in an ally which might some day assist 
them in their long-delayed revenge on Germany. These 
loans of money were followed by Russian orders in France 
for military equipment. 
"It was this general situation which finally 
drew Russia and France, both of them isolated and 
fearing that Great Britain might join the Triple 
Alliance, into a diplomatic understanding. Even 
so, the Russians appear to have been somewhat 
reluctant, but a French hint that future loans 
were dependent on a bargain brought them to terms. •1 9 
The first step taken was when the French fleet visited 
the Russian naval base near St. Petersburg. 11All Europe 
was properly shocked when the autocratic Tsar listened 
bareheaded to the playing of the Marseillaise, but there 
10 
was no doubt about the Franco-Russian partnership. 11 
This friendship was formally acknowledged by an exchange 
of notes between the two governments on the 27th of 
August, 1891. The agreement contained no military 
9 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple 
Entente (New York: Henry Holt and Co. 1947) p:-r;;o 
10 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple 
Entente (New York: Henry Holt and Co. 1947) P:-4°0 
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guarantees but did require the two governments to consult 
with one another if any emergency arose. The French 
people, always afraid that they would be attacked by 
Germany were not satisfied with a vague agreement. Another 
meet,ing was held in 1892 where an understanding was reached 
between the French and Russian general staffs. But it was 
two years before the Czar consented to the ratification 
of the military agreement. Even then the terms were kept 
secret. The essential provisions were as follows: 
"Article I. If France is attacked by Germany, 
or by Italy supported by Germany, Russia shall 
employ all her available forces to fight Germany. 
If Russia is attacked by Germany, or by Austria 
supported by Germany, France shall employ all her 
available forces to fight Germany. 
Article II. In case the forces of the Triple 
Alliance or one of the Great Powers which compose 
it should be mobilized, France and Russia, at the 
first indication of the event, and without previous 
agreement being necessary, shall mobilize all their 
forces immediately and simultaneously, and shall 11 
transport them as near to the frontier as possible." 
11 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple 
Entente (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1947) P:-4°2 
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The two countries agreed that neither would conclude a separate 
peace and that the treaty should last as long as the Triple 
Alliance. "The Dual Alliance and the Triple Alliance did, it 
would seem, guarantee the peace of Europe; at least they 
preserved it. During these years the two groups stood side by 
side; often there was considerable co-operation between them. 
Only later developments caused them to take position face to face." 
This new alliance did not at first alarm Germany because she 
felt that the Triple Alliance was as strong as the new 
combination. Also she felt that England held the balance 
of power, would not join with France or Russia. However, the 
alliance did give Germany a new respect for her neighbors. 
The system of alliances by creating this feeling of respect 
between countries helped to curb situations which might have 
developed into war. 
When France and Italy ended their dispute over Tunis 
by a treaty a change was made in Italy 1 s alignment with 
Germany in the Triple Alliance. Italy was bound to Germany 
only in case Germany was attacked by France without direct 
provocation, and Italy was to decide what was direct 
provocation. In this new agreement Italy promised France 
she would remain neutral in case of an attack on Germany 
12 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple 
Entente (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1947) P~4 
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12 
by a foreign power. Thus Bismarck was proved correct 
in his analysis of the Italians as "undependable children". 
They could not be relied upon. 
The .Anglo-French Entente of 1904 began when M. 
Delcasse' signified his intention of seeking an under-
standing with England. He knew that if France were to 
expand her colonial empire, and perhaps some day recover 
Alsace-Lorraine, her hostility with England must end. 
They had been nearing agreement for some time. This 
agreement was helped along by two events. First, Germany 
had supported the proposal of the Egyptian government, 
which was British, that certain international funds should 
be used to reconquer the Sudan. France and Russia opposed 
this so the British undertook the 9A'J>edition without aid. 
Sir Herbert Kitchner defeated the native army of Sudan 
in September, 1898. Then he learned that Major Marchand 
with French troops had arrived at Fashoda. When Kitchner 
reached Fashoda he requested the withdrawal of French 
troops, and Marchand refused to leave. The British were 
ready to fight to protect their colonies in the Sudan, but 
the French were not ready to undertake a war at this time 
so Marchand•s forces withdrew. England ma.de one concession 
by permitting a strip of the Eastern Sahara to come under 
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French influence. This pleased France because it gave 
her an outlet on the Nile. So in March, 1899, this 
long dispute between France and England was settled. 
The second circumstances which removed obstacles 
from a British-French agreement was a change in French 
policy. Delcasse' was aware that France had relied too 
long on Russia alone, that Germany was always the real 
enemy of the French. He had come to power with a plan 
to resolve Anglo-French difficulties •. 
It was the British, however, who made the first move. 
The death of Queen Victoria and the retirement of Lord 
Salisbury in 1902 opened the way for closer relations with 
France. Edward VII had spent much time in Paris and knew 
the French, so in the spring of 1903 he went to France for 
a visit. At first the French were cool towards him, but 
his charm won their friendship. Two months later President 
Loubet and Delcasse 1 began the conversations which led to 
the signing of the Entente Cordiale eight months later on 
April 8, 1904. A series of talks settled many long 
standing disputes between the two countries. An important 
question was settled when France gave England a free hand 
in Egypt and in return the French were given a free hand 
in Morocco. They agreed also to give each other diplomatic 
support. 
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While this new entente dealt only with questions 
outside Europe, yet Europe was affected by it, because 
if France and England were pledging their agreements 
in African affairs they would very likely cooperate in 
other areas. The Entente Cordiale was not directed 
against Germany or any other country, but it did provide 
a restraint on Germany's policy. 
The Entente Cordiale had now a far more reaching 
effect than it was thought to have at the time. 
"There is little conclusive evidence that at 
the outset England planned to isolate Germany or 
to encourage France to count on England for more 
than diplomatic support, and even this was to be 
limited to the case of Morocco. On the other hand, 
there is much evidence that, within a few months, 
the Anglo-French Entente came to have a far wider 
significance inimical to the peace of Europe--
partly owing to Germany•s clumsy and alarming 
diplomatic gestures.'' 13 
The Anglo-French agreement was the cause of concern 
to some British diplomats who feared it might bring about 
war with Germany. Germany's diplomats were surprised at 
the move, and hoped it would help to maintain peace in 
Europe. They began to countermove. Their plan was to 
attack the French policy in Morocco thereby hoping that 
they could gain a section themselves. But William the II 
disapproved of this move, for he had no wish to antagonize 
the French. Bulow waited for nearly a year but Delcasset 
13 Sidney B. Fa:y, The Ori,ins of the World War (New 
York: The MacMillan co:-;-1931 P. lb7~ ~ 
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said nothing about the Moroccan agreement so Bulow 
prevailed upon the Kaiser against the latter's will 
to land at Tangier and proclaim Morocco a free state. 
Rouvier, the French Prime Minister, was alarmed and 
since the negotiations over Morocco were made by 
Delcasse', suggested that the latter's resignation 
might avert the crisis. Then the Moroccan question 
could be submitted to an international conference. 
Rouvier disapproved the German action but Bulow and 
Holstein insisted that if necessary he would stand 
behind the issue with force. Delcasse' defended his 
policy and informed the French cabinet that if Germany 
did mean war England had an alliance with the French. 
Delcasse 1 felt that the British were pushing France and 
Germany into war so he resigned. Germany had come out 
victorious in the encounter, but her successes were 
short lived. Rouvier said that Germany had not been 
acting in good faith, so he turned to England who assured 
him of British good will. The Entente Cordiale was 
strengthened and the diplomatic position of France was 
more secure. 
When the Russians fired on British fishing vessels 
in the North Sea a crisis developed between Russia and 
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Great Britain. Germany offered Russia an alliance which 
they thought they could force France to join, but the 
crisis subsided and the Germans had failed to get an 
alliance with France. 
The def eat of Russia in the Far East and the revolutionary 
movement at home had brought the Russian government into 
difficulty. In July, 1905, William the II invited Nicholas 
the II to meet him in Finnish waters. Nicholas accepted 
and when William cleverly suggested that the two of them 
conclude a treaty, the Czar fell in with the plan. On 
July 24, the treaty of Bjorke was signed. This treaty 
provided for an alliance between Russia and Germany. 
William had hoped that Russia could persuade her ally, 
France, to join them in an alliance. "The treaty might have 
been, as the Emperor said, 1a turning point in the history 
of Europe', that is, if France had been willing to join 
it." 14 W1lliam1 s fondest hope was for a five nation 
treaty, a continental league, and he felt now that his dream 
would come true. 
14 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple 
Entente (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1947) P:--73 
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His confidence was short-lived. Chancellor Bulow 
threatened to resign. Count Lamsdorf, the Tsar 1 s 
Foreign Minister, was equally perturbed because he felt 
the Bjorko Treaty was contrary to the spirit of the Russo-
French Alliance. He assured the Tsar that France would 
never join in such a treaty. Thereupon Nicholas the II 
notified William tha.t the treaty would have to be amended. 
William refused and the Bjorko incident was ended. 
Great Britain formed a new Liberal government in 
December of 1905 with Sir Edward Grey taking the place of 
Landsdowne who had negotiated the Entente Cordiale. France 
asked Great Britain for their backing at the Morocco 
Conference but this Grey would not give without Parliament's 
consent because the Entente was not a defensive alliance. 
He did agree, however, to military conversations between 
the French and British military staffs, but specified that 
the talks would not be binding. It is significant to note 
that the French in making their plans assumed that the 
British would do certain things. The British organized 
the army and had consultations with the Belgian military 
staff. The Entente Cordiale had become stronger. As 
Winston Churchill remarked, 
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"Henceforth the relations of the two staffs 
became increasingly intimate and confidential •••• 
However explicitly the two governments might 
agree and affirm to each other that no national 
or political engagement was involved in these 
technical discussions, the fact remained1that they 
constituted an exceedingly potent tie." 5 
A peculiar situation had developed in that France, 
the ally of Russia was now on cordial terms with Great 
Britain. Great Britain was the ally of Japan who was at 
war with Russia. Delcasse 1 had been working toward an 
understanding between Russia and Great Britain and had 
made no secret of it. The British were not unwilling and 
had, in fact, made overtures to Russia in 1903 but nothing 
had come of it because the Russians were aware of British 
influence in Japan. When Russia was defeated by the 
Japanese she turned her attention to the Near East where 
the situation was now different. Great Britain no longer 
opposed Russian policy in Turkey. Since she was well 
entrenched in Egypt she was indifferent to Turkey's fate. 
Within Russia the revolution of 1905 had given opportunity 
for Russian liberalism and so the time seemed ripe. 
Sir Edward Grey, a liberal, welcomed the entente with 
France and also favored an understanding with Russia. 
l5 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple 
Entente (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1947) P:--75 
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The Anglo~Russian agreement which dealt with the Middle 
East was signed August 31, 1907. There were three documents 
dealing with Tibet, Persia, and Afghanistan. Tibet was 
to remain under Chinese influence. Afghanistan was to be 
a buffer state between Russia and British India. Persia 
was divided into three spheres of influence, Russian, 
British and a neutral zone. The Shah of Persia was not 
consulted. Both Russia and Great Britain assured Germany 
that the treaty was not directed against her, but Germany 
knew that having established cordial relations the two 
countries could unite and challenge her interests. More 
than that Great Britain, France and Russia were now 
closely associated and together they could offer a 
formidable opposition to the Triple Alliance. 
In this same year Russia and Japan, although they 
had recently been at war, signed an agreement, while France 
and Japan whose relationship had been strained by the 
Russo-Japanese War, concluded a treaty by which they agreed 
to respect the independence and integrity of China and 
the principal of the "open door". 
Great Britain and France with Spain published 
declarations for maintaining the status quo in the 
.Mediterranean. Germany did not approve of this relationship. 
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The Algeciras Conf erenc~ of 1906 was important in 
that though Germany seemed to win she actually lost 
because Great Britain was led into naval and military 
talks which ultimately brought her against Germany in 
1914. 
Russia had promised Austria that she could annex 
Bosnia and Herzegovina when the right time had come. 
Austria assumed the time had come and annexed the two 
territories. Russia's part of the bargain securing the 
opening of the straits for her warships had to be 
confirmed by other powers. This precipitated a crisis 
in two ways. Since the population of the two territories 
was largely Serb, Serbia had hoped to annex them herself. 
Germany announced that if Austria invaded Serbia an~ 
Russia intervened Germany would mobilize. France and 
England had no wish to be drawn in so Russia abandoned 
Serbia after a stiff note from Germany. The Triple Alliance 
had stood successfully against the Triple Entente. Russia, 
however, began to reorganize and expand her military power. 
The British increased their navy and the Triple Entente 
was strengthened. 
Germany's new chancellor, Bethman-Hollweg wanted to 
improve relations with at least one of the powers of the 
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Triple Entente so he approached Great Britain because of 
Grey's insistance that there was nothing against Germany 
in their agreements with Russia and France. England 
refused to remain neutral in a possible European war so 
the negotiations were fruitless except that a friendlier 
relationship was created between the two governments. 
Bethman-Hollweg ne«t turned to Russia and at Potsdam an 
agreement was made which caused considerable commotion in 
England and France because they teared that Russia might 
have betrayed her partners in the Triple Entente. 
The Moroccan agreement of 1909 had not accomplished 
everything that was hoped for, but it had brought about 
better relations between France and Germany. However, 
international disorder in Morocco made French occupation 
of Fez imminent so Germany sent her warships to Agadir 
ostensibly to protect the Germans there, but since there 
were no Germans in the vicinity the French decided to 
refrain from sending their own ships to Agadir and wait for 
Germany to make the next move. This surprised Kiderlen, 
German foreign minister, so he suggested that the French 
Congo would be acceptable as their price for allowing 
France to have Morocco. The French bluntly refused his 
off er but an agreement between France and Germany was made 
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on November 4, 1911, by which Germany agreed to a French 
protectorate over Morocco and received in return a portion 
of the French Congo. The Germans were disappointed with 
the results and blamed England who had suspected German 
intentions and had made a statement to the effect that 
Britain could not be ignored when her interests were 
vitally affected. She had stepped up the military 
conversations with France and settled the details of the 
plans for the armies to fight side by side. 
The situation was tense and the German emperor approved 
Tirpitz 1 s plans for extending the German navy although 
agreements had been made to follow the naval program laid 
down earlier. Lord Haldane, the British minister of war, 
who Wlderstood the Germans well, went to Berlin. He was 
informed that the Germans would give up plans for increasing 
their navy if they could have the assurance of British 
neutrality in case of war. Agreement was impossible though 
the motives of both parties were sincere. In effect the 
Germans said, 
"Situated as we are between France and 
Russia, we cannot discuss a limitation unless 
Great Britain will abandon the Triple Entente. 
To this the British replied: We cannot 
abandon the Entente if you continue to add to 6 your navy, for you have the Triple Alliance." 1 
l6 Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple 
Entente (New YDi!k: Henry Holt and Co., 1947) P. 91 
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Bethman-Hollweg, though he had tried to weaken the Triple 
Entente by negotiating with each member in turn, had not 
been successful and had in fact only made the three 
nations suspicious of his intentions. The Triple Entente 
was stronger than ever before and had perhaps postponed 
war for a time. 
When Italy attacked Tripoli in September, 1911, the 
Russian government proposed a conference with France, and 
Poincare, the French premier and minister of foreign 
affairs, realized .that without Russia's support France 
could not stand up to Germany. He also knew that he must 
be in a position to influence Russian policy in the Near 
East. He encouraged talks with Izvolski, the Russian 
Ambassador to Paris and the two cooperated with England 
in tightening the Triple Entente. Poincare announced that 
"France is incontestably disposed to peace 
and neither seeks nor desires war, but the intez-
vention of Germany against Russia would immediately 
modify this state of mind ••• in such case parliament 
and public opinion would entirely approve the 
decision of the government to lend armed support to 
Russia." 17 
Poincare next turned to affairs in the Balkans. He 
learned in August, 1912, when he was visiting Russia, of a 
l7 Ibid: P. 94 
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treaty between Serbia and Bulgaria which the Russians 
helped to negotiate. He urged that Russia henceforth 
consult with France about her policies, and was 
instrumental in restraining Russia from taking premature 
action in the Balkans. He also exerted pressure on Serbia 
who was pushing her dispute with Austria. In fact in 
1913-1914 France and Russia were able to work together in 
an effort to settle the quarrels in the Balkans. Naturally 
their view was directly opposed to that of the Triple 
Alliance so the cleavage in Europe was gradually becoming 
more clear. 
Notes between the French and the British confirmed 
their cooperation in military and naval affairs though an 
open and formal alliance was impossible because of 
Parliament's unwillingness to grant it. Britain had never 
reached as close relationship with Russia as France had, 
and Germany was still banking on Britain1 s neutrality. 
However, in the spring of 1914 Russia suggested that the 
Triple Entente become a formal alliance, and Grey a.greed 
to discuss it with his colleagues. He recognized that 
Russia was a formidable power and hoped to continue 
friendly relations with her. 
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The powers of the Triple Alliance were likewise more 
closely united in July, 1914. The alliance had been 
renewed in December,1912. Austria was not sure of the 
reliance they could place on Italy, but Germany had no 
such fears about her. And in fact Germany at this time 
had no quarrels with France. The German ambassador had 
written in February, 1914, that the salvation of France 
must be sought in a better relationship with Germany. 
Alsace-Lorraine had not been forgotten but he thought 
it would be unlikely that France would try to revive the 
issue. The Near East and its problems seemed the real 
threat to the peace in Europe. Russia deplored the 
increase of German influence in Turkey because she still 
wanted the use of the Straits. Turkey was friendly to 
the Triple Alliance and had an agreement with Bulgaria. 
It was Serbia who occupied the key position at this 
time. Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had 
caused a six months crisis and started the drift towards 
war. As the Germans had been unified under Bismarck there 
was, in 1914, a movement for unification of all the Slavic 
peoples south of the Danube. The natural leader of this 
movement was Serbia, because independent herself, she 
wished to secure the independence and unification of the 
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rest of the Serbs. Moreover, Serbia was not only a 
threat to the Hapsburgs and an impediment to Germany, 
she was actually a wedge of the influence of the Triple 
Entente in the Balkans. 
The terms of the settlement of Buk.arest in April, 
1913, had proven so unsatisfactory that it seemed unlikely 
that they would stand. The Balkan States were so worn out 
by wars that the treaty might have held if the Balkan 
States only had been concerned. But the diplomatic 
prestige of the Powers had suffered. For Austria and 
Germany the settlement of 1913 was not only a humiliation 
but was a danger. Austria was threatened at home as Serbia 
became stronger and an internal revolution of the Slavs 
in Austria seemed imminent. Austria was determined to 
break up Serbian power. German military prestige had 
suffered and she had failed in her diplomacy. 
Consequently during the fall of 1913 and the spring 
of 1914 Austria waited for an opportunity that might give 
her an excuse to attack Serbia. The Serbian government 
was aware of this and were careful to maintain a correct 
attitude. On June 28, 1914, Austria's opportunity came 
with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir 
apparent to the Austrian crown. The murder was committed 
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by a member of a Serb nationalist group called the 
11 Black Hand" society. Austria sent ultimatum to Serbia 
that meant the end of Serbian independence. Serbia's 
reply was conciliatory but Vienna rejected it and declared 
war on July 28. The Russians urged Serbia to comply. 
England offered to mediate but Austria was determined 
on war. Russia mobilized on July 30, Germany on July 31, 
and Germany declared war on Russia on August 1, and 
against France on August 3. The alliances held firm but 
the two armed camps now faced each other, and Europe 
was at war. 
11 That evening as he looked out from the 
windows of the foreign off ice in London this 
English country gentleman (Sir Edward Grey) 
spoke words that have echoed plaintively down 
the years. 'The lamps', he said, 1are going 
out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit 
again in our lifetime.• 11 18 
To repeat a statement made earlier in this paper, 
treaties and alliances in themselves do not create order 
or stability; they only reflect such stability as may 
already exist. 
18 David Thomson Europe Since Napoleon (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1962~ P. 507 
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The fundamental meaning of this experiment in the balance 
of power is that Western civilization, under the leadership 
of Europe and America, lacked the internal cohesiveness 
to preserve the favored position of world rule which it 
had established. Given another chance after World War I, 
it failed again. It is interesting to note that most of 
the Pre-World War I alliances and ententes were primarily 
concerned with the settlement of differences between 
European countries concerning their colonial interests 
outside of Europe. They thought to preserve Western 
domination of the world by finding a basis for dividing 
it up. In the end they may have lost the world right in 
the heart of Europe itself. It is sometimes said that 
when the Chinese observed the Germans fighting the British 
and French in China in World War I they realized that the 
European man had an Achilles heel, namely, his own internal 
divisions. Unable to solve their own internal problems, 
the leaders of Western civilization exhausted themselves 
in war and may have lost the ability and the right to 
rule the rest of the world. It is hardly necessary to 
illustrate the point by ref erring to the post World War II 
period. The Communists have found another way of 
exploiting the same Western weakness and it has been 
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expressed in the phrase, possibly apochryphal, attributed 
to Stalin, that 11 the road to Rome and Paris, lies through 
Shanghai and New Delhi 11 • In this context the Triple 
Entente and the Triple Alliance appear to be an ironic 
last pirouette of European leadership on the world stage. 
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